Chairs
Julien Jeanneney jeanneney@unistra.fr; Nicoletta Perlo nicoletta.perlo@hotmail.fr

The concept of ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ denotes the propensity of political leaders—in States endowed with constitutions originally conceived as democratic and liberal—to circumvent or neutralise countervailing powers, whether by legal means or otherwise, whenever these are perceived as a hindrance to the efficacy of their action. This evolution, which profoundly affects the modalities of the exercise of political power in numerous contemporary legal orders, manifests in the emergence of forms of low-intensity authoritarianism.

The leaders in question do not hesitate to assail the founding principles of political and legal liberalism, placing them at the service of authoritarian-leaning projects. Deployed within pluralist systems, these practices instrumentalise the very tools of constitutionalism to undermine what
historically constituted its core: the balance of powers and the guarantee of rights and freedoms.

This workshop aims to examine this phenomenon from various angles.
Firstly, it will seek to delineate its contours: How can we measure the degree of intensity of authoritarian tendencies in these hybrid regimes? Is it possible to identify common criteria? Subsequently, the analysis will address the distinct stages of the process leading to authoritarian constitutionalism, as well as the strategies implemented by institutional actors: the alteration of the balance of powers, the progressive curtailment of fundamental rights, and the
marginalisation of supranational law.

Particular attention will be paid to the use of certain prerogatives which, whilst constitutionally compliant, may—in specific contexts and constitutional cultures—fuel a regression towards illiberalism. Finally, possible institutional reactions to such tendencies will be examined, whether to facilitate them or to resist them.