Chairs
Gonzalo Andrés Ramírez Cleves (gonzalo.ramirez@uexternado.edu.co)
Andrés Camilo Gómez Calcetero (a.gomezc234@uniandes.edu.co)
Constanza Blanco Barón (constanza.blanco@uexternado.edu.co)
Katherine Flórez Pinilla (katherine.florez1@uexternado.edu.co)
Paula Ahumada Franco (paulaahumada@derecho.uchile.cl)
Adriana Zapata Giraldo (adriana.zapata@uexternado.edu.co)

During the 20th century, the norms regulating the objectives, functions, and architecture of central banks—authorities charged primarily, though not exclusively, with the management of monetary policy—were elevated to constitutional rank. Making their reform more difficult has been considered a guarantee of autonomy from governments, whose interference could threaten macroeconomic stability. The constant debate regarding the impact of monetary policy interest rates on national growth and employment levels evidences this tension, which is added to others, such as the discussion between the technical dimension and the legitimacy of the central banking model in democracies.

In addition to the foregoing, central banks face additional challenges such as the effects of climate change, the irruption of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies in their disruptive dimensions—such as blockchain and applications like crypto-assets—and the necessity of integrating the sustainability paradigm into their analyses, inter alia.

This workshop is offered as a space to reflect upon the validity, impact, adequacy, and sufficiency of contemporary constitutional arrangements regarding central banks to face these challenges. Through the discussion of these and other questions from orthodox and heterodox perspectives, as well as comparative local and international experiences, we hope to offer attendees a panoramic view of these issues. We invite the presentation of proposals that allow for the enrichment and deepening of these debates based on the following guiding questions:

What impact would this have on the safeguarding of monetary sovereignty, which is the exclusive prerogative of the central bank?

Is the central banking model adequate and valid?

Is a central banking design possible that successfully harmonises the technical vision of the banks with the interests of democratically legitimised governments?

Should the functions and objectives of central banks be modified (expanded or reduced)? Or, conversely, should their labour be reduced strictly to the management of monetary policy?

What should be the limits of their intervention in the economy, particularly in times of crisis?

What improvements in terms of governance could these institutions adopt?

In accordance with the constitutional and legal framework, could central banks issue public digital currency in the face of the disruption entailed by the “explosion” of private digital currency issuance?