Chairs:

• Ursula Indacochea: uindacochea@dplf.org
• Adriana García García: adriana.garcia@nyu.edu

SPEAKERS

Anselmo	Coelho Hernández
José Raymundo	Díaz Fernández
Juan Reynaldo	Salinas Goytia
Leonardo Pablo	Palacios
Miguel Angel	Erroz Gaudiano
Patricia	Lozano Sanabria
Stephanie Michelle	Alvarez Arias

In the diverse expressions of the Rule of Law model characteristic of the Continental European legal tradition, the election of the highest political authorities—through the individual, direct, and secret vote of the citizenry—stands as the paradigm of political representation. In this context, the majoritarian principle functions as the principal mechanism of democratic legitimation for elected authorities. Conversely, in this same model, the selection of high-ranking authorities within justice systems—magistrates of Supreme Courts, Judicial Councils, or Attorneys General—is conducted via second-degree mechanisms. In these instances, one or several elected authorities, or a combination thereof, select, nominate, and/or elect adjudicators guided by the meritocratic principle, with the objective of guaranteeing their separation and independence from other state powers.

In recent years, several Latin American countries have modified their constitutional texts to incorporate—with varying scopes—the election of judges by popular vote. This mechanism was already utilised in the United States and Switzerland. In the former, the majority of states elect certain judges in this manner or require a vote to confirm their appointment (retention election). This same mechanism is employed in Switzerland at the cantonal level to elect certain first-instance judges. In Latin America, Bolivia introduced it for the election of all its high courts in its 2009 constitutional text; and in 2024, Mexico adopted it for the election of the totality of federal and state judges in the country.

The proposed workshop seeks to explore the transplantation of these mechanisms in light of the apparent tension between the majoritarian principle and the meritocratic principle, addressing the following questions: Is the tension between these principles irresolvable, or is it possible to introduce safeguards that allow for its resolution? What are the limits of the mechanism of popular election in the case of adjudicators? What are its potential impacts on the guarantee of judicial independence?go dentro de los sistemas de justicia —magistrados de Cortes Supremas, Consejos de la Judicatura o Fiscales Generales— se lleva a cabo mediante mecanismos de segundo grado. En estos casos, una o varias autoridades electas, o una combinación de ellas, seleccionan, nominan y/o eligen a los adjudicadores guiados por el principio meritocrático, con el objetivo de garantizar su separación e independencia de otros poderes del Estado.