Chairs:

• Antonio D’Aloia
• Irene Spigno

Speakers

Elisa Viviana Esther	Carrazzoni
María Sofía	Sagüés
Arthur	De Oliveira D’arede
Carlos Augusto	Conde Gutierrez
María Guadalupe	Ríos Sánchez
Sanya	Samtani

Constitutional systems are increasingly required to address the long-term sustainability of democratic governance, especially in relation to the protection of future generations. One emerging practice is the assessment of the impact of legislation on future generations, which has gained visibility in pioneering jurisdictions such as Wales and Finland. Hungary has even established an Ombudsman for Future Generations, whilst Italy is currently discussing the potential introduction of a similar mechanism through legislative proposals and academic debate. These developments reflect the growing need to embed intergenerational justice within constitutional practice. This trend is particularly visible in Latin America, where innovative forms of constitutional environmentalism—such as the recognition of the rights of nature in Ecuador and Bolivia, and the Colombian jurisprudence on the Amazon—have explicitly linked environmental protection to the rights of future generations. More broadly, constitutional courts—from Germany to South Korea—have recognised that laws must account for long-term effects on future rights. These initiatives show that the sustainability of constitutional systems depends not only on immediate legitimacy but also on their capacity to preserve the rights of those yet to come.

A second, often overlooked dimension is the role of age thresholds in political and judicial office. Minimum ages for candidacy, retirement ages for judges, and automatic limits for high offices all represent constitutional mechanisms for balancing generational turnover with institutional continuity. Whilst some systems, such as the United States, lack formal age limits for judges (with Supreme Court Justices holding lifetime appointments), others adopt strict retirement ages to guarantee renewal. These rules illustrate how constitutions structure intergenerational power-sharing and raise normative questions about fairness, competence, and sustainability.

AJ control the exercise of public power in all its cycles (elections, nominations, removals, the legality of acts and contracts of the public administration, the extracontractual liability of the State for the actions or omissions of its agents)? Is this an absolute judicial control, or do zones excluded from the judicial control of the CAJ subsist, which are also not attributed to other authorities of the Judicial Branch? Is there an inextricable link between the control exercised by the CAJ in light of the principle of the Democratic Rule of Law and the constitutional guarantee of its independence regarding other powers?