Chairs:

• Tania Busch Venthur – taniabusch@gmail.com
• Diego Valadés Ríos – valades@unam.mx
• Francisco Zúñiga Urbina – ffzuniga@zcabogados.cl.

SPEAKERS

Elodia	Almirón-prujel
Gonzalo	Cortes Moreno
Maria Gabriela	Abalos
Carlos	Glave Mavila
Omar	Salas Camacho

Miguel Alejandro	Estela La Puente
Pamela	Aguirre Castro

A significant part of the constitutional debate at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one has focused on the role of constitutional justice in contemporary democracies. The advantages and disadvantages of strong versus weak constitutionalism, the judicialization of politics, and judicial activism are central topics in constitutional thought, given the pivotal position of constitutional justice within political systems. However, the intense theoretical debate has often been overtaken by reality. In practice, the power of institutions exercising constitutional adjudication has steadily expanded. Discussions about the virtues and vices of judicial activism are insufficient to fully explain the phenomenon. Today, constitutional judges are not only called upon to place limits on the democratic legislature; they are increasingly required to address new problems, often in response to the inaction of elected authorities.

Constitutional courts are now asked to resolve issues that go far beyond what was envisioned when their organization and powers were originally conceived. Through traditional procedural mechanisms such as habeas corpus, amparo, declarations of unconstitutionality, or jurisdictional disputes, litigants seek answers to issues as diverse as the protection of animals, rivers, or mountains; blocking constitutional reforms that concentrate power in the executive; forcing elected branches to design public policies; or using constitutional litigation as a political weapon (lawfare). A procedural structure designed under the paradigm of constitutional judges as “negative legislators,” and under the illusion of formalism, collapses when confronted with such demands, disrupting the classical understanding of separation of powers and inevitably leading to judicial activism—at best—or political capture—at worst.

Moreover, the catalogue of rights that courts are expected to protect continues to expand. New rights enter constitutional systems through international human rights law. Meanwhile, courts’ institutional tools have remained static and outdated. This raises fundamental questions: Does the method for appointing constitutional judges reflect what is expected of them? Should standing be broadened for citizens to initiate collective conversations on rights protection? Is the structure of constitutional review procedures suitable for addressing collective problems? Is it possible to design constitutional review processes that incorporate citizen participation? What can and cannot be ordered through constitutional judgments?