Chairs:

• Andrés Mauricio Gutiérrez Beltrán andresm.gutierrez@uexternado.edu.co
• Silvia Haydee Sánchez Gómez silvia.sanchez@uarm.pe
• Juan Manuel Sosa Sacio jsosas1@unmsm.edu.pe

SPEAKERS

Franco Matias

Jaimes Soto

Diana Esther	Guzmán R.
Edward	Pérez
Ernesto	Deza
Farith	Pérez Quintero
Italo M.	Forttini Aguilar
LAURA	OSPINA-MEJIA
Silvia	Sánchez

One of the main challenges facing constitutionalism concerns the widespread and systematic violations of fundamental rights, which require the design and implementation of public policies for their resolution. In some jurisdictions, this phenomenon has been referred to as an “Unconstitutional State of Affairs.” In a context of institutional normality, democratic frameworks entrust representative authorities with the responsibility for addressing these problems. However, at times these authorities are unable to achieve the mandated objective, leading courts to become involved in resolving these disputes. Their intervention seeks to ensure the protection of the violated rights. To fulfill this task, courts have resorted to so-called structural judgments, that is, decisions that identify widespread and systematic violations of fundamental rights and order the design and implementation of public policies as a remedy to address the situation of rights violations. The complexity of these decisions often makes it difficult for them to be executed according to their terms or within the established timelines. Thus, another challenge arises concerning the implementation process and the effects of structural decisions.

Debate has emerged around whether these judgments are compatible with the democratic order. Those who consider them compatible argue that, through such rulings, courts assume responsibility for protecting a valuable democratic element: the duty to safeguard fundamental rights. In contrast, critics view this phenomenon as a serious threat to the classical separation of powers and therefore reject it. A third perspective holds that it is appropriate to incorporate democratic mechanisms—such as greater deliberation—into courts’ structural processes. What is clear is that structural judgments are an increasingly common phenomenon across different regions and levels, both national and supranational.