Chairs
• Lucia Scaffardi lucia.scaffardi@unipr.it
• Vito Breda Vito.Breda@unisq.edu.au
• Giovanna Tieghi giovanna.tieghi@unipd.it

SPEAKERS

Luis Abel	Zarate-meriles
Sanya	Samtani
Vanessa	Tassara Zevallos

Constitutional crises and episodes of democratic backsliding are now recurring even in otherwise stable democracies. These shocks expose persistent weaknesses in how institutions manage conflict whilst preserving core constitutional values. The typical response—unilateral assertions of authority by either Parliament or the Judiciary—may secure short-term results but ultimately erodes legitimacy and inhibits institutional learning.

This workshop moves beyond diagnosis towards design. It asks a central question: how can constitutional systems structure principled exchanges between institutions so that disagreement produces reasoned deliberation, timely corrections, and durable settlements?

Theoretical Framework: Dialogical Comparative Constitutionalism

Dialogical Comparative Constitutionalism (DCC) treats constitutional interpretation and decision-making as a reciprocal practice between the Legislature and the Judiciary. It occupies a middle ground between strong-form judicial supremacy and absolute legislative sovereignty. Whilst preserving the formal separation of powers, DCC introduces procedural duties to provide reasons and respond within defined forums and timeframes. Dialogue is conceived as institutional architecture, built on identifiable triggers for engagement, clear venues for exchange, and publication standards that make reasoning auditable. The aim is to stabilise rights protection, deepen democratic participation, and enhance policy adaptability over time.

Comparative Focus

The workshop builds on a comparison of Italy and Australia, read alongside French practice, to show how dialogic infrastructures operate across different legal families.

Both the Italian and Australian legal systems have navigated recent constitutional and political strains without collapsing into zero-sum institutional confrontations. In Italy, constitutional review uses dialogic techniques that signal to the legislature and calibrate the temporal effects of decisions to invite statutory adjustment whilst preserving distinct roles. In Australian state and territory settings, rights-oriented review frameworks create structured exchanges that encourage parliamentary reconsideration without directly invalidating laws.

These approaches are contested in both Italy and Australia; the seminar treats that contestation as an analytical opportunity to test when dialogue improves coordination and when it risks hindering separation of powers principles. France has been leading the way in Dialogical Comparative Constitutionalism, and perhaps it could serve as a reference for comparative enrichment. In France, advisory scrutiny of draft legislation and constitutional review before promulgation embed reason-giving within executive and legislative processes. France and other similar examples might indicate that the building blocks for dialogical constitutionalism exist, yet they remain fragmented and under-theorised as a portable toolkit.

Call for Contributions

We invite theory-led and empirical papers that specify the triggers, forums, and protocols that initiate and sustain dialogue, and that develop concise indicators to assess its quality and effects. Contributions should test the portability of these models across diverse institutional, historical, and cultural contexts, including federal and devolved systems and settings with additional interpretive authorities, such as Indigenous legal orders and independent agencies. Authors are encouraged to address the potential benefits of dialectical engagement, as well as its attendant risks, including judicial and legislative overreach.