Chairs
• Daniel Alejandro Monroy daniel.monroy@uexternado.edu.co
• Andrés Palacios Lleras Andres.palaciosl@urosario.edu.co

Constitutions maintain a close relationship with economics and with the functioning of markets and economic systems, which manifests in multiple forms and gives rise to diverse debates. For instance, constitutional norms typically establish the foundations for the protection of property rights, private autonomy, freedom of enterprise, and free competition, all of which are essential elements for the functioning of a market economy. However, constitutions also tend to determine an economic order and, in turn, establish limits to said rights, occasionally for the fulfilment of a social function or for the protection of the public interest, inter alia. In synthesis, constitutions have inescapable economic effects, but simultaneously, economic phenomena influence the manner in which constitutional norms are interpreted and applied.

Naturally, this debate between economists and constitutionalists is not new, yet it possesses different facets and expressions across diverse regions of the globe. By way of example, part of the debate in Europe has been directed towards discussing how electoral rules and forms of government established in constitutions affect the formulation of economic policies (Persson & Tabellini, 2005; 2004; Kurrild-Klitgaard & Berggren, 2004). For its part, in the United States, the debate is usually presented as embedded within the context of the ‘Economic Analysis of Law’ (Posner, 1987; Cooter, 2002). In the case of Latin America, the debate tends to centre on the gap between reality and the socioeconomic rights incorporated into constitutions (Landau, 2023; Couso, 2017). In this region, discussions also frequently address the quality of the institutional framework established in constitutions and its effects on economic performance (a debate that even underpinned the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics awarded to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson).

Added to all the foregoing are numerous additional transversal themes that feed the dialogue between economics and constitutional law, such as inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, poverty, sustainable development, and the tensions between the model of the Regulatory State and the Constitutional State (Scott, 2010).

In this context, this workshop will explore these complementarities and tensions, amongst others, between economic and constitutional debates. To this end, the following general guiding questions are suggested:

What is the role of the ‘Regulatory State’ of the economy in modern constitutionalism?

How can the role of the social market economy be balanced with constitutional liberties?

What is the role of constitutions in the design and evaluation of economic policies in different countries?

How do economic policies influence the interpretation of constitutional law?

What has been the role and impact of constitutional courts in regulated economic sectors?

What is the role of economic methodologies (e.g., cost-benefit analysis) in constitutional argumentation?

What is the impact of institutions—the ‘rules of the game’ included in constitutions—on economic growth?